Volume 35
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 35,
1930-1931
3-1-1931

Irresistable Impulse to Commit Crime
W.H. Hitchler

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
W.H. Hitchler, Irresistable Impulse to Commit Crime, 35 DICK. L. REV. 145 (1931).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol35/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
(1) under seal.
(2) based upon a consideration.
(3) drawn in conformity with the Uniform Written
Obligations Act.8
(4) contained in a writing which acknowledges the receipt
of a consideration therefor.
W. H. Hitchler.

IRRESISTABLE IMPULSE TO COMMIT CRIME
The existence of inclinational insanity described as "an
irresistable inclination to kill or to commit some other
particular offense"1 was recognized by the earlier Pennsylvania cases, 2 but whether such insanity must be accompanied by some mental error, illusions, delusions, or hallucination in order that it might constitute a defence was not consistently determined. 8
The question was discussed principally in homicide
cases. Killing under an impulse to kill presupposes that the
death of the victim is contemplated and intended. It presupposes also a knowledge of the physical qualities of the
act done and of its physical consequences. Suppose there
exists also a knowledge of its moral nature and also a
knowledge of its legal nature and consequences. Does it,
under such circumstances, constitute a defense in criminal
cases?
In 1908, Dr. Trickett, after a careful examination of the
cases said: "Probably the answer must be in the affirmative. If there can be an irresistable impulse to kill, despite the horror which such an act excites in the normal
* man, it is not impossible, despite the realization by the
mind that suffers it, of the reprobation that killing excites
6

Act of May 13, 1927, P. L. 985.

'Coyle v. C., 100 Pa. 573.
2C.

v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264; Taylor v; C., 109 Pa. 262; C. v. Hillman,

189 Pa. 548.
3Compare C. v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 and C. v. Hillman, 189 Pa. 548.
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in other minds, and in the Divine mind, and of the penal
4
consequences which will ensue.'
Later cases seem to confirm this opinion, 5 but to assert
the qualification that it must be shown to be an habitual
tendency.' In C. v. Cavalier" the court said: "Defendant's
counsel submitted to the court a point couched in the following language: 'If the jury believe that the defendant
was actuated by an irresistable inclination to kill the defendant is entitled to an acquittal, even though he were able
to distinguish right from wrong'. Complaint is made because the court did not affirm this point. To have done so
would have been to have overturned the law on the subject
of the responsibility for crime as it has existed in this
Commonwealth at least from C. v. Mosler, (1864) 4 Pa. 264
down to the present day. For the court to have affirmed
the point as presented would have been a recognition of the
"irresistable impulse" theory without limitations or conditions of any sort. If there has been any departure from
this wise rule which makes the test of the accused's responsibility, his ability to distinguish between right and wrong,
it has been surrounded at all times with the restrictions
imposed by Chief Justice Gibson in C. v. Mosler where he
said: 'The doctrine which acknowledges this mania (an irresistable impulse to kill) is dangerous in its relations
and can be recognized only in the clearest cases. It ought to
have been habitual, or at least to have evinced itself in more
than a single instance. To establish it as a justification
in any particular case, it is necessary to show, by clear
proof its contemporaneous existence evinced by present
circumstances, or the existence of an habitual tendency developed in previous cases, becoming in itself a second
nature.
'Criminal Law, p. 1104.
5C. v. De Marzo, 223 Pa. 573. "The power to distinguish right and
wrong is not always the only test of responsibility, since this power
may exist without the power of self control."
9C. v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474.
7284 Pa. 311, 131 Atl. 229.
84 Pa. 267.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In the most recent case, C. v. Schroeder,9 the court
apparently holds that "irresistable impulse" even if shown
to be habitual is not a defense. The court said: "This recital of facts we have deemed necessary because of the
main defense interposed in the appellant's behalf, which
was that she was the victim of an uncontrollable impulse
to rob, steal and flee. * * * * Every habitual criminal might

excuse his wrongdoing on the ground that his impulses
moved him to break the law. It may be that unrestrained
impulses operate in many crimes, but society for its own
protection cannot recognize such a state of mind as excusing the wrongdoer. The court should have told the jury
that the defense of irresistable impulse is one which our law
does not recognize." The court cited C. v. Mosler, supra.
A decision that denies an exemptive effect to mental
diseases which affect the conative emotional life of an actor,
or his power of inhibiting acts that he apparently knows to
be wrong and illegal, is sure to be provocative of criticism.
In view of the recent progress of medical and psychological
learning it is to be regretted that the court was content to
base its decision upon a Gibsonian hypothesis propounded
in 1846.
W. H. Hitchler.

RECENT CHANGES IN THE INHERITANCE
TAX LAWS
The Act of May 16, 1929, P. L. 1795 amending the Inheritance Tax Act of June 20, 1919, P. L. 521 and its
supplements has made several distinct changes in the
classes of property on the transfer of which a tax is to
be levied.
Under the Act of 1919 a tax was to be levied under
Section 1 (d), "when any person or corporation comes into
the possession or enjoyment * * * * of any property trans-

ferred pursuant to a power of appointment contained in any
instrument taking effect after the passage of this act".
9302 Pa. 1, 152 Atd. 835 (Nov. 24, 1930).

